The Secret Language of Twelve-Over Bowling Tactics: The Combination of Slower Balls, Bouncers, and Line-Wide Deliveries

At the end of twelve overs, the scoreboard read 68/3. Many will look at the bowlers' names and assume this was expected. But the table I kept while watching the match, not the scoreboard itself, is what matters here. Between the ninth and twelfth overs, only two boundary balls were hit in each of the three overs. In other words, the bowlers bowled as if the batter could not play a single shot off those six deliveries. Of those six balls, three were slower balls, one was a bouncer, one was a half-trapper from the off-spinner, and one was a first-slower. In other words, no signal in the bowling plan was repeated across two consecutive deliveries. That is the real story of this match. The foundation of this analysis is the over-by-over table in my own notebook. I recorded the type, pace, line, and the batter's response for each ball separately. Three numbers have been extracted from this table. The first is the ratio of slower balls. From the second over to the twelfth over, 48 percent of all deliveries were slower balls. The second is the bouncer ratio, which was 12 percent. The third is the ratio of line-wide deliveries, which was just 4 percent. Looking at these three numbers together shows that the bowlers did not become dependent on any one type of delivery. They mixed different types of deliveries in every over, putting the batter in a chain of decisions. I have watched many matches where bowlers first establish a type of delivery and then bowl it repeatedly. That is a normal tactic. But in this match, the tactic was reversed. The bowlers first gave the batter familiarity with one type of delivery, and then broke that familiarity. Take the third ball of the ninth over as an example. The bowler first bowled a slower ball outside off stump. The batter blocked it. On the next ball, the bowler bowled a slower ball again, but this time reduced the pace further. The batter, trying to match the timing of the previous ball, sent it beyond the boundary line. This single delivery changed the momentum of the match. Now the question is, does this tactic always work? To answer that, we need comparisons. I have kept two analyses at hand. The first is the average ratio of slower balls in the last ten matches, which was 32 percent. The second is the average bouncer ratio in those ten matches, which was 15 percent. The numbers in this match are somewhat different from those averages. The slower ball ratio is higher, and the bouncer ratio is lower. But the reason for this difference is probably the condition of the pitch. The pitch was slow, and the ball was coming in slowly. In such conditions, the effectiveness of bouncers decreases and the importance of slower balls increases. So the numbers in this match should be seen not as a new tactic, but as a response to the conditions. A caution must be raised here. A high ratio of slower balls in one match does not mean the bowler will always use that tactic. The pitch, the environment, the opposition's composition, and the phase of the match are what actually decide. I have kept two analyses at hand. The first is the average ratio of slower balls in the last ten matches, which was 32 percent. The second is the average bouncer ratio in those ten matches, which was 15 percent. The numbers in this match are somewhat different from those averages. The slower ball ratio is higher, and the bouncer ratio is lower. But the reason for this difference is probably the condition of the pitch. The pitch was slow, and the ball was coming in slowly. In such conditions, the effectiveness of bouncers decreases and the importance of slower balls increases. So the numbers in this match should be seen not as a new tactic, but as a response to the conditions. Another point must be brought into discussion. The bowlers have not only changed the type of ball, they have also changed the line. From the twelfth over onwards, the ratio of deliveries outside off stump has increased. This is a tactical decision. Bowling outside off stump forces the batter to move outside, which is risky for them. But this tactic has a limit. If the batter is well accustomed, they can cut for a boundary. In this match, two boundaries have come exactly like that. So it cannot be claimed that the bowlers' tactic was successful. Rather, it should be said that the bowlers made the right decisions, but the batters were somewhat dependent on luck. I must briefly state the method of my analysis. I have recorded the type, pace, line, and the batter's response for each ball separately. Three numbers have been extracted from this table. The first is the ratio of slower balls. From the second over to the twelfth over, 48 percent of all deliveries were slower balls. The second is the bouncer ratio, which was 12 percent. The third is the ratio of line-wide deliveries, which was just 4 percent. Looking at these three numbers together shows that the bowlers did not become dependent on any one type of delivery. They mixed different types of deliveries in every over, putting the batter in a chain of decisions. Now, what should we watch in the next match? I will personally observe two things. The first is the condition of the pitch. If the pitch remains slow, the ratio of slower balls will again be high. The second is the batters' response. If the batters can correct their timing against slower balls, the bowlers' tactic will not work. Observing these two things will show how permanent this tactic is. As a closing remark, the numbers of one match are never a final decision. They only show a picture of a moment. The real analysis is to view that picture in the context of the conditions. I followed that principle while analyzing this match. In the next match, I will again use the same method, because that is the only way we can try to understand the truth of the match.